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SUMMARY
International terrorism has long been
recognized as a serious foreign and domestic
security threat.  This issue brief examines
international terrorist actions and threats and
the U.S. policy response. As the 9/11 Com-
mission report released on July 19, 2004,
concludes, the United States needs to use all
tools at its disposal, including diplomacy,
international cooperation, and constructive
engagement to economic sanctions, covert
action, physical security enhancement, and
military force.
A modern trend in terrorism is toward
loosely organized, self-financed, international
networks of terrorists.  Another trend is to-
ward terrorism that is religiously- or
ideologically-motivated. Radical Islamic
fundamentalist groups, or groups using reli-
gion as a pretext, pose terrorist threats of
varying kinds to U.S. interests and to friendly
regimes. A third trend is the apparent growth
of cross-national links among different terror-
ist organizations, which may involve combi-
nations of military training, funding, technol-
ogy transfer, or political advice.
Looming over the entire issue of
international terrorism is a trend toward
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). For instance, Iran, seen as the most
active state sponsor of terrorism, has been
secretly conducting a longstanding uranium
enrichment program, and North Korea has
both admitted to having a clandestine program
for uranium enrichment and claimed to have
nuclear weapons. (See CRS Issue Brief
IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program, by Larry A. Niksch.) On December
19, 2003, Iran signed an agreement allowing
international inspections of nuclear sites; on
December 21, 2003,  Libya announced similar
intentions. Indications have also surfaced that
Al Qaeda has attempted to acquire chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
As a result, stakes in the war against interna-
tional terrorism are increasing and margins for
error in selecting appropriate policy instru-
ments to prevent terrorist attacks are diminish-
ing.
U.S. policy toward international terror-
ism contains a significant military component,
reflected in the war in Iraq; U.S. operations in
Afghanistan; deployment of U.S. forces
around the Horn of Africa, to Djibouti, and the
former Soviet Republic of Georgia; and
ongoing military exercises in Colombia.
Issues for Congress include whether the Ad-
ministration is providing sufficient informa-
tion about the long-term goals and costs of its
military strategy and whether military force is
necessarily an effective anti-terrorism
instrument in some circumstances.
As terrorism is a global phenomenon, a
major challenge facing policy makers is how
to maximize international cooperation and
support, without unduly compromising impor-
tant U.S. national security interests. A grow-
ing issue bedeviling policymakers is how to
minimize the economic and civil liberties
costs of an enhanced security environment.
The issue of how to combat incitement to
terrorism — especially in instances where
such activity is state sponsored or counte-
nanced —  perplexes policymakers as well.
On July 22, 2004, the National Commis-
sion on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (“9/11 Commission”) issued its final
report. On December 17, 2004, the President
signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, establishing a





In what many see as a major setback to faltering Middle East peace efforts, Hamas won
76 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Authority’s Parliamentary elections on January 25,
2006.  Hamas is one of the more than 30 organizations the United States and other
governments have designated as terrorist organizations.  Its leaders have repeatedly called
for the destruction of Israel and the organization uses terrorist attacks against civilians as a
tactic to achieve that goal. Concern exists that should a Hamas-controlled government
support terrorism in deed as well as rhetoric, a new Palestinian state might well be declared
a state sponsor of terrorism, lose foreign aid, and face economic sanctions. Moreover, absent
a meaningful renunciation of terrorism, nations are reviewing the pros and cons of continuing
foreign assistance to a Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The War on Terrorism
The Administration’s response to the September 11, 2001 events was swift, wide-
ranging and decisive.  Administration officials attributed responsibility for the attack to
Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization.  One result was an announced policy shift
from deterrence to preemption, generally referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.”  (National
Security Strategy, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html].)  Given the potential
catastrophic consequences of terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction,
Administration decisionmakers felt that the nation could not afford to sit back, wait for
attacks to occur, and then respond.  The nation was mobilized; combating terrorism and
crippling Al Qaeda became top national priorities.  Preemptive use of military force against
foreign terrorist groups and infrastructure gained increasing acceptance in Administration
policy circles.  In addition, a February 14, 2003, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html] gave added emphasis
to the role of international cooperation, law enforcement and economic development in
countering terrorism.
A full-scale campaign was launched, using all elements of national and international
power, to go after Al Qaeda and its affiliates and support structures.  The campaign involved
rallying the international community, especially law enforcement and intelligence
components, to shut down Al Qaeda cells and financial networks.  A U.S. military operation
was launched in early October 2001, against the Taliban regime — which had harbored Al
Qaeda since 1996 — and against Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan.  A total of 136
countries offered a range of military assistance to the United States, including overflight and
landing rights and accommodations for U.S. forces.  As a result, the Taliban was removed
from power, all known Al Qaeda training sites were destroyed, and some Taliban and Al
Qaeda leaders were killed or detained.  Since then, according to President Bush in his address
to the nation on May 1, 2003, nearly half of the Al Qaeda leadership has been captured or
killed.  Notwithstanding, top Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri as
well as the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar apparently remain at large.
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On March 19, 2003, after an intensive military buildup in the Persian Gulf, the United
States launched the war with Iraq, one of seven nations on the State Department’s sponsors
of terrorism list, with an attack on a suspected meeting site of Saddam Hussein.  President
Bush, in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address, emphasized the threat posed to
world security by a Saddam Hussein armed with weapons of mass destruction and stated that
Iraq “aids and protects” the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.  After a swift military campaign,
President Bush announced on April 15, 2003, that “the regime of Saddam Hussein is no
more.”  Saddam Hussein was arrested by U.S. personnel December 13, 2002, near his
hometown of Tikrit.
In addition to U.S. troops currently in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have been dispatched
to Yemen, the Philippines, and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia to train local militaries
to fight terrorists. In FY2002 and FY2003, the Administration sought and received funding
and permission to use such funding (subject to annual review) for U.S. military aid to
Colombia to support the Colombian government’s “unified campaign against narcotics
trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security.”  Similar
authorization has granted for FY2004 and FY2005.  Previously, such assistance had been
restricted to supporting counterdrug operations in Colombia.
In the context of this campaign the United States has stepped up intelligence-sharing
and law enforcement cooperation with other governments to root out terrorist cells.  It is
increasingly apparent that such cells are operating not just in places where they are welcomed
or tolerated but in many other places, including Western Europe and the United States.
According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Patterns 2003) [http://www.state.gov/
s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/c12153.htm], as of January 2003 an aggressive international law
enforcement effort had resulted in detention of approximately 3,000 terrorists and their
supporters in more than 100 countries and in the freezing of $124 million in assets in some
600 bank accounts around the world, including $36 million in the United States alone. On
June 2, 2003, the G-8 leaders publicized plans to create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group
to assist nations in enhancing their anti-terrorism capabilities. Anticipated areas of activity
include (1) outreach to countries in the area of counter-terrorism cooperation and (2)
providing capacity building assistance to nations with insufficient capacity to fight terrorism.
An encouraging sign in the anti-terrorism struggle has been the apparent willingness of
certain states to distance themselves  from international terrorism and/or development of
weapons of mass destruction.  Libya renounced its WMD programs on December 21, 2003,
and has cooperated extensively with the United States and the international community in
dismantling those programs. On December 19, 2003, Iran signed an agreement allowing
international inspections of its nuclear facilities.  Iran has been secretly conducting a
longstanding uranium enrichment program. Intensive inspections have revealed likely
violations of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement, and while
Iran has promised to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, there are indications
that the suspension is not complete. Sudan, in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, has arrested Al Qaeda members and “by and large” shut down Al
Qaeda training camps on its territory.  Libya has reportedly offered to share intelligence
information on Al Qaeda’s activities with U.S. authorities and Syria has promised to clamp
down on terrorist groups on its territory and cutback overall support for terrorist groups. On
June 10, 2004, press reports aired allegations, yet to be confirmed, that Libyan leader




Increasingly, international terrorism is recognized as a threat to U.S. foreign and
domestic security. Both timing and target selection by terrorists can affect U.S. interests in
areas ranging from preservation of commerce to nuclear non-proliferation to the Middle East
peace process.  A growing number of analysts expresses concern that radical Islamic groups
seek to exploit economic and political tensions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia,
Jordan, Pakistan and other countries.  Because of their avowed goal of overthrowing secular
regimes in certain countries with large Moslem populations, such groups are seen as a
particular threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
On April 27, 2005, the Department of State sent to Congress its annual report on global
terrorism.  The report has a new title and format this year: Country Reports on Terrorism
2004.  Country Reports, which serves as the basis for the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism which are subject  to U.S. sanctions, continues to provide detailed reports on anti-
terror cooperation by nations worldwide.  However, this year and in the foreseeable future,
statistical data on terrorist incidents will be provided separately by the newly created
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).  Preliminary data was released by the NCTC
in conjunction with the release of Country Reports.  The NCTC will likely release its
statistical data later this year.
The report continues to list Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism and to mute
criticism of nations deemed to be of strategic importance to the United States such as Saudi
Arabia, which the report notes “continued to support the global war on terror” and took
“aggressive actions” to prevent terrorists from crossing their borders into Iraq. The report
also cites Pakistan as one of the United States’ most important partners in the war on
terrorism, and notes that Pakistani security services are cooperating closely with the United
States and other nations to eliminate terrorism.  Echoing  language of last year’s version, the
report notes that Libya and Sudan have taken significant steps to cooperate in the global war
on terror, but otherwise contains little to fuel speculation that Khartoum and Libya are
imminent candidates for removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terror.
A core premise of a second major chapter of the report is recognition that because
terrorism is assuming the characteristics of an ideological movement, it will not be decisively
defeated overnight. Thus, as in any long-term campaign, international cooperation and
capacity-building programs such as the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program (ATA) program are seen as having a central role in combating terrorism.  Moreover,
most terrorist acts do not take place in the United States, nor do most terror related arrests
and prosecutions.  Likewise, much, if not most, intelligence gathered on terrorist groups
today is not done by the United States.  Terrorist sanctuaries are often found within the cities
of democratic societies, and countries with weak counterterrorism resources and
infrastructure are, in effect, becoming virtual sanctuaries for terrorism. The report also
presents countering terrorism on the economic front as an important component of a
successful strategy, although many independent analysts suggest that terrorist groups are
often becoming self supporting and that the amount of terrorist funding governments seize











Source:  Congressional Research Service
Note:  Based on data provided in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 and subsequent
developments.  Iraq was removed from the list on October 20, 2004.
Spectrum of State Supported Terrorism
Data released by the NCTC indicate that in 2004 roughly 9,300 individuals wounded
or killed in significant international terrorist incidents as compared to 4,271 the previous
year.  (International incidents are those involving citizens of more than one country;
significant involves bodily injury or death or property damage greater than $10,000.)  Of
those, 1,907 were killed in 2004 — in contrast to 625 deaths in 2003.
In 2004, there were 651 significant attacks as compared to 208 in 2003 — roughly a
threefold increase.  Ten percent of total significant incidents (64 attacks) were against U.S.
interests, down from over 1/3 in last year’s data.  Of the 68 Americans killed last year, all but
eight were killed in Iraq or Afghanistan, making the overwhelming number of victims of
terrorism in 2004 non-U.S. citizens, and although precise data is lacking, many were
Muslims.  To the extent that such year-to-year data can be interpreted as indicative of trends,
and not simply erratic blips on the radar screen, the data supports the contention that
terrorism is becoming less U.S.-focused and more global in scope.
Moreover, last year’s data can be interpreted to mean that terrorist incidents are
becoming more deadly.  The top five attacks last year resulted in over 4,000 casualties
(wounded and dead).  Geographically, few attacks were conducted in Europe.  In Iraq, the
number of incidents against non-combatants rose roughly ninefold from 22 in 2003 to 201
in 2004.
Definitions
There is no universally accepted definition of international terrorism.  One definition
widely used in U.S. government circles, and incorporated into law, defines international
terrorism as terrorism involving the citizens or property of more than one country.
Terrorism is broadly defined as politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.  For example, kidnaping
of U.S. birdwatchers or bombing of U.S.-owned oil pipelines by leftist guerrillas in Colombia
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would qualify as international terrorism.  A terrorist group is defined as a group which
practices or which has significant subgroups which practice terrorism (22 U.S.C. 2656f).
One shortfall of this traditional definition is its focus on groups and its exclusion of
individual (“lone wolf”) terrorist activity which has recently risen in frequency and visibility.
To these standard definitions which refer to violence in a traditional form must be added
cyberterrorism.  Analysts warn that terrorist acts will now include more sophisticated forms
of destruction and extortion such as disabling a national computer infrastructure or
penetrating vital commercial computer systems.  Finally, the October 12, 2000 bombing of
the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. military vessel, raised  issues of whether the standard definition
would categorize this attack as terrorist, as the Cole may not qualify as a “non-combatant”
(see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke).  Though the definition of terrorism may
appear essentially a political issue, it can carry significant legal implications.
Current definitions of terrorism mostly share one common element: politically
motivated behavior; although religious motivation is increasingly being recognized as an
important motivating factor as high-profile activities of such groups as Al Qaeda and Hamas
underscore the significance of selective religious ideologies in driving terrorist violence, or
at least providing a pretext.  To illustrate: Osama bin Laden issued a fatwah (edict) in 1998
proclaiming in effect that all those who believe in Allah and his prophet Muhammad must
kill Americans wherever they find them [http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm].
Moreover, the growth of international and transnational criminal organizations and the
growing range and scale of such operations has resulted in a potential for widespread
criminal violence with financial profit as the driving motivation.  Notwithstanding, current
definitions of terrorism do not include using violence for financial profit, not even in cases
where mass casualties might result with entire populations “terrorized.”  
Complicating matters is that internationally, nations and  organizations historically have
been unable to agree on a definition of terrorism, since one person’s terrorist is often another
person’s freedom fighter.  To circumvent this political constraint, countries have taken the
approach of enacting laws or negotiating conventions, which criminalize specific acts such
as kidnaping, detonating bombs or hijacking airplanes.  The 1999 International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [http://untreaty.un.org/English
/terrorism.asp] comes close to a consensus definition, by making it a crime to collect or
provide funds with the intent of killing or injuring civilians where the purpose is to
intimidate a population or coerce a government.
U.S. Policy Response
Framework
Past Administrations have employed a range of measures to combat international
terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to
economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures, and military force.  The
application of sanctions is one of the most frequently used anti-terrorist tools of U.S.
policymakers.  Governments supporting international terrorism are prohibited from receiving
U.S. economic and military assistance.  Export of munitions to such countries is foreclosed,
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and restrictions are imposed on exports of “dual use” equipment. Presence of a country on
the “terrorism list,” though, may reflect considerations — such as its pursuit of WMD or its
human rights record or U.S. domestic political considerations — that are largely unrelated
to support for international terrorism.
Generally, U.S. anti-terrorism policy from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s focused on
deterring and punishing state sponsors as opposed to terrorist groups themselves. The
passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132)
signaled an important shift in policy.  The act, largely initiated by the executive branch,
created a legal category of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and banned funding,
granting of visas and other material support to such organizations.  The USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 (P.L. 107-56) extended and strengthened the provisions of that legislation.  Patterns
2003 lists 37 groups designated by the Secretary of State as FTOs (see also
[http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Apr/29-636067.html]).
On September 24, 2003, the White House (OMB) released its 2003 Report to Congress
on Combating Terrorism, which details spending by federal agency and mission area for
combating terrorism and homeland security.  The report is widely considered to be an
authoritative source of information on executive branch spending, program initiatives, and
priority terrorism-related areas for FY2002 through FY2004 [http://www.whitehouse.gov
/omb/inforeg/2003_combat_terr.pdf].
Dilemmas
In their desire to combat terrorism in a modern political context, democratic countries
often face conflicting goals and courses of action:  (1) providing security from terrorist acts,
that is, limiting the freedom of individual terrorists, terrorist groups, and support networks
to operate unimpeded in a relatively unregulated environment, versus (2) maximizing
individual freedoms, democracy, and human rights.  Efforts to combat terrorism are
complicated by a global trend towards deregulation, open borders, and expanded commerce.
In democracies such as the United States, the constitutional limits within which policy must
operate are seen by some to conflict directly with a desire to secure the lives of citizens
against terrorist activity more effectively.  This issue has come to the fore in the post-
September 11 period as the federal government has acquired broad new powers to combat
internal terrorism.
Another challenge for policymakers is the need to identify the perpetrators of particular
terrorist acts and those who train, fund, or otherwise support or sponsor them. As the
international community increasingly demonstrates its ability to unite and apply sanctions
against rogue states, states will become less likely to overtly support terrorist groups or
engage in state sponsored terrorism. The possibility of covert provision of weapons,
financing, and logistical support remains, and detecting such transfers will require
significantly increased deployment of U.S. intelligence assets in countries and zones where
terrorists operate.  Particularly challenging is identification of “dual use” items — subject
to U.S. export restrictions — which might creatively be adapted for military application (see
CRS Report RL31669, Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons
and Options for Lessening Their Impact, by Dana A. Shea; CRS Report RL31780, Trade and
the 108th Congress: Major Legislative and Oversight Initiative, by Raymond J. Ahearn; CRS
Report RL31826, Protecting our Perimeter: “Border Searches” under the Fourth
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Amendment, by Stephen R. Vina; and CRS Report RS21422, Dual Use Biological
Equipment: Difficulties in Domestic Regulation, by Dana A. Shea).
Today, the U.S. policy focus is on terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and affiliated
networks, and state supporters.  (See also CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and
Evolving Ideology, by Christopher M. Blanchard.)  But in the future, it may be that new types
of terrorists will emerge:  individuals who are not affiliated with any established terrorist
organization and who are apparently not agents of any state sponsor.  The terrorist Ramzi
Ahmed Yousef, who is believed to have masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, apparently did not belong to any larger, established, and previously identified
group, although he may have had some ties to Al Qaeda operatives.  Also, should
organizational infrastructure of groups such as Al Qaeda continue to be disrupted, the threat
of individual or “boutique” terrorism, or that of “spontaneous” terrorist activity, such as the
bombing of bookstores in the United States after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death edict against
British author Salman Rushdie, may well increase.  Thus, one likely profile for the terrorist
of the 21st century may well be a private individual not affiliated with any established group,
but drawing on other similarly-minded individuals for support.  Because the U.S.
international counter-terrorism policy framework has been sanctions-oriented, and has
traditionally sought to pin responsibility on state sponsors, changes in policy and approaches
are regularly being considered and implemented.
Another problem surfacing in the wake of a number of incidents associated with Islamic
fundamentalist groups is how to condemn and combat such terrorist activity, and the extreme
and violent ideology of specific radical groups, without appearing to be anti-Islamic in
general.  A desire to punish a state for supporting international terrorism may also conflict
with other foreign policy objectives involving that nation, such as human rights concerns.
Continuing Terrorist Threats
Facing the possibility that a number of states may be rethinking their sponsorship of
terrorist organizations, such organizations appear to be establishing operating bases in
countries that lack functioning central governments or that do not exercise effective control
over their national territory.  An example is a November 17, 2003 Washington Post press
report of Al Qaeda affiliates training Indonesian operatives in the southern Philippines. In
general, gray area “terrorist activity not functionally linked to any supporting or sponsoring
nation” represents an increasingly difficult challenge for U.S. policymakers.
Terrorists have been able to develop their own sources of financing, which range from
NGOs and charities to illegal enterprises such as narcotics, extortion, and kidnaping.
Colombia’s FARC is said to make hundreds of millions annually from criminal activities,
mostly from taxing or participating in the narcotics trade.  Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda depends
on a formidable array of fundraising operations including Muslim charities and wealthy well-
wishers, legitimate-seeming businesses, and banking connections in the Persian Gulf, as well
as various smuggling and fraud activities. Furthermore, reports are ongoing of cross-national
links among different terrorist organizations.
 Looming over the entire issue of international terrorism is an apparently inexorable
trend toward proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or the means to make
them. All of the seven officially designated state sponsors of terrorism, Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
IB10119 02-02-06
CRS-8
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, were known or suspected to have programs for the
development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.  (Suspicions regarding Cuba are
controversial.)  Three of the states — Iran, Libya, and North Korea — have nuclear weapons
programs — or the potential to convert to them — at varying stages of development.  This
was also believed to be true of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. On December 19, 2003, Iran
signed an agreement allowing international inspections of nuclear sites; on December 21,
2003 Libya announced similar intentions.  Whether listed states have actually supplied
terrorists with WMD wherewithal is not known with certainty; yet the possibility of covert
transfers or leakages clearly exists. Furthermore terrorists have attempted to acquire WMD
technology through their own resources and connections.  For instance, the Aum Shinrikyo
cult was able to procure technology and blueprints for producing Sarin, a deadly nerve gas,
through official contacts in Russia in the early 1990s.  The gas was subsequently used in an
attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 that killed 12 people and injured 5,000.
Media reports of varying credibility suggest that Osama bin Laden has joined the WMD
procurement game.  A London Daily Telegraph dispatch (12/14/01) cites “long discussions”
between bin Laden and Pakistani nuclear scientists concerning nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons.  The Hindustan Times (11/14/01)  claims that a bin Laden emissary tried
to buy radioactive waste from an atomic power plant in Bulgaria and cites the September
1998 arrest in Germany of an alleged bin Laden associate on charges of trying to buy reactor
fuel (see also London Times, 10/14/01).  A U.S. federal indictment handed down in 1998
charges that bin Laden operatives sought enriched uranium on various occasions. Other
accounts credit Al Qaeda with attempting to purchase portable nuclear weapons or “suitcase
bombs” through contacts in Chechnya and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, U.S. government
sources reported discovery of a partly-constructed laboratory in Afghanistan in March 2002,
in which Al Qaeda may have planned to develop biological agents, including anthrax.  In
April 2002, a captured Al Qaeda leader, Abu Zubaydah, told American interrogators that the
organization had been working aggressively to build a dirty bomb, in which conventional
explosives packaged with radioactive material are detonated to spread contamination and
sow panic. BBC reports (1/30/03) cite the discovery by intelligence officials of documents
indicating that Al Qaeda had built a dirty bomb near Herat in Western Afghanistan. In
January 2003, British authorities reportedly disrupted a plot to use the poison ricin against
personnel in England (see CRS Report RS21383, Ricin: Technical Background and Potential
Role in Terrorism, by Dana Shea and Frank Gottron).
U.S. Policy Tools to Combat International Terrorism
Diplomacy/Constructive Engagement.  Use of diplomacy to help create a global
anti-terror coalition is a central component of the Bush Administration response to
September 11 events.  Diplomacy, for example, was a key factor leading to the composition
of the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban.   Diplomacy may not always be effective against
determined terrorists or the countries that support them.  However, in most cases, diplomatic
measures are considered least likely to widen conflicts and therefore are usually tried first.
When responding to incidents of terrorism by subnational groups, reacting by
constructive engagement is complicated by the lack of existing channels and mutually
accepted rules of conduct between governmental entities and the groups in question. In some
instances, legislation may specifically prohibit official contact with a terrorist organization
or its members.  Yet for groups that are well-entrenched in a nation’s political fabric and
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culture, engaging the group might be preferable to trying to exterminate it.  Colombia’s on-
again, off-again peace process with FARC is one recent example.  Some observers, though,
are skeptical of the value of engaging with terrorists.  Former CIA director James Woolsey
has noted, in a Spring, 2001, National Strategy Forum Review article, that increasingly,
terrorists do not just want a place at the table, “they want to blow up the table and everyone
who is sitting at the table.”
On a different level, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration
explored the possibility of enlisting state sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya, Sudan, and
Syria, in a broader Islamic coalition against Al Qaeda and its followers.  The United States
also has held discussions with Iran concerning formation of a post-Taliban coalition
government in Afghanistan. To some critics, though, such initiatives detract from the
imperative of taking a principled stand against international terrorism in all its guises. In mid-
December 2003, both Iran and Libya announced that they would open their nuclear sites to
international inspections. On June 10, 2004, press reports aired allegations that Libyan leader
Muammar Qadhafi was involved in an plot, spawned in 2003, to assassinate Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah.
The media remain powerful forces in confrontations between terrorists and
governments.  Influencing public opinion may impact not only the actions of governments
but also those of groups engaged in terrorist acts.  From the terrorist perspective, media
coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act.  In hostage-type incidents,
where the media may provide the only independent means a terrorist has of knowing the
chain of events set in motion, coverage can complicate rescue efforts.  Public diplomacy and
the media can be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments
to take action against terrorism.  An example would be to mobilize the tourist industry to
pressure governments into participating in sanctions against a terrorist state.
Economic Sanctions.  Sanctions regimes can be essentially unilateral — such as
U.S. bans on trade and investment relations with Cuba and Iran — or multilateral, such as
that mandated in response to the Pan Am 103 bombing.  In the past, use of economic
sanctions was usually predicated upon identification of a nation as an active supporter or
sponsor of international terrorism.  Yet sanctions also can be used to target assets of terrorist
groups themselves.  On September 23, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224
freezing the assets of 27 individuals and organizations known to be affiliated with bin
Laden’s network, giving the Secretary of the Treasury broad powers to impose sanctions on
banks around the world that provide these entities access to the international financial system
and providing for designation of additional entities as terrorist organizations.  By late
October 2002, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, the freeze list had expanded to
include  designated terrorist groups, supporters, and financiers of terror. In addition, on
September 28, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which requires all
states to “limit the ability of terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate internationally”
by freezing their assets and denying them safe haven.  The Security Council also set up a
Counter Terrorism Committee to oversee implementation of Resolution 1373.  U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1390 of January 16, 2002, obligated member states to freeze funds of
“individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities” associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
As of September 11, 2003, in the range of $200 million in terrorist funds had been frozen




The effects of these economic measures are uncertain because much of the flow of
terrorist funds reportedly takes place outside of formal banking channels (in elusive “hawala”
chains of money brokers).  Alternatively, international banks in the Persian Gulf are
reportedly used to manipulate funds through business fronts owned by Osama bin Laden.
Furthermore, much of Al Qaeda’s money is believed to be held not in banks but in
untraceable assets such as gold and diamonds.  Also, some observers have noted that lethal
terrorist operations are relatively inexpensive. 
With respect to nation-states, economic sanctions fall into six categories: restrictions
on trading, technology transfer, foreign assistance, export credits and guarantees, foreign
exchange and capital transactions, and economic access.  Sanctions may include a total or
partial trade embargo, an embargo on financial transactions, suspension of foreign aid,
restrictions on aircraft or ship traffic, or abrogation of a friendship, commerce, and
navigation treaty. 
The President has a variety of laws at his disposal, but the broadest in its potential scope
is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223; 50 USC 1701,et seq.).
The act permits imposition of restrictions on economic relations once the President has
declared a national emergency because of a threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy,
or the economy.  Although the sanctions authorized must deal directly with the threat
responsible for the emergency, the President can regulate imports, exports, and all types of
financial transactions, such as the transfer of funds, foreign exchange, credit, and securities,
between the United States and the country in question.  Specific authority for the Libyan
trade embargo is in Section 504 of the International Security and Development Cooperation
Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), while Section 505 of the act (22 U.S.C. 2349aa9) authorizes the
banning of imports of goods and services from any country supporting terrorism.  (See also
CRS Report RS20871, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), by Kenneth Katzman, and the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172); 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.)  Other major laws that can
be used against countries supporting terrorism are the Export Administration Act of 1979
(P.L. 96-72), the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629), and specific items or provisions
of foreign assistance legislation.  P.L. 90-629 prohibits arms sales to countries not fully
cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts and  requires that aid be withheld to any nation
providing lethal military aid to a country on the terrorism list.
 The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration  Act of 2003, P.L. 108-
175, signed December 14, 2003,  calls for new sanctions against Syria until the Asad regime
stops providing support for terrorists groups and ceases other activities at variance with U.S.
policy.  Past Administrations have been critical of Syria’s support for terrorism; interest in
acquiring weapons of mass destruction; and military presence in Lebanon. An array of U.S.
legislation currently bans aid to, and restricts commercial dealings with Syria, and P.L. 108-
175 would further restrict diplomatic and commercial dealings with the Asad regime. On
May 11, 2004, President Bush imposed economic sanctions against Syria, charging it had
failed to take action against terrorist groups fighting Israel and failed to take action to halt
the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.  As a result, most U.S. exports to Syria (which total
about $200 million a year) would be banned.  (See CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S.
Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B. Prados.)
Economic Inducements.  Counter-terrorism initiatives might include efforts to
change economic and social conditions that provide a breeding ground for terrorists.  It has
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been noted that most terrorists worldwide are unemployed or underemployed with virtually
nonexistent prospects for economic advancement.  Some analysts believe that targeted
assistance programs to reduce poverty and ignorance (which might also include supporting
secular educational alternatives to the Madrassahs — Islamic religious schools) can make
a difference in lifestyles and attitudes and diminish the appeal of extremist groups.  A further
rationale, they say, is to project a more positive image of the United States in terrorism-prone
lands.  Critics, though, argue that severe economic conditions are not the sole or even the
main motivational factors driving the emergence of terrorism, stressing that resentment
against a particular country or political order and religious fanaticism also are important
motivations.  Osama bin Laden’s large personal fortune and his far-flung business empire
would seem to contradict economic deprivation as explanations of his terrorism.  Similarly,
all of the 15 Saudi Arabian hijackers implicated in the September 11 attacks were from
middle-class families or well-connected ones. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty
organization (ETA) in Spain is a relatively well-heeled terrorist organization.  Ambient
economic conditions partly explain certain kinds of terrorist behavior in specific situations,
but political factors play a significant role as well.
Covert Action.  Intelligence gathering, infiltration of terrorist groups, and military
operations involve a variety of clandestine or “covert” activities.  Much of this activity is of
a passive monitoring nature aimed at determining the strategic intentions, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations.  An active form of covert activity occurs during
events such as a hostage crisis or hijacking when a foreign country may quietly request
advice, equipment, or technical support, with no public credit to be given the providing
country.  Covert action may also seek to exploit vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations, for
example, by spreading disinformation about leaders, encouraging defections, promoting
divisions between factions, or exploiting conflicts between organizations.
Some nations have periodically resorted to unconventional methods beyond their
territory for the express purpose of neutralizing individual terrorists and/or thwarting pre-
planned attacks.  Examples of activities might run the gamut from intercepting or sabotaging
delivery of funding or weapons to a terrorist group, to destroying a terrorist’s embryonic
WMD production facilities, to seizing and transporting a wanted terrorist to stand trial for
assassination or murder.  Arguably, such activity might be justified as preemptive self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. charter.  On the other hand, it could be argued that such
actions violate customary international law. The Senate and House Intelligence Committees,
in a December 10, 2002 report, have recommended maximizing covert action to counter
terrorism [http://intelligence.senate.gov/recommendations.pdf].
Assassination is specifically prohibited by U.S. executive order (most recently, E.O.
12333), but bringing wanted criminals to the United States for trial is not.  There exists an
established U.S. legal doctrine that allows an individual’s trial to proceed regardless of
whether he is forcefully abducted from another country, international waters, or airspace.
Experts warn that bringing persons residing abroad to U.S. justice by means other than
extradition or mutual agreement with the host country can vastly complicate U.S. foreign
relations, sometimes jeopardizing interests far more important than “justice,” deterrence, and
the prosecution of a single individual.   Notwithstanding the unpopularity of such abductions
in nations that fail to apprehend and prosecute those accused, the “rendering” of such wanted
criminals to U.S. courts is permitted under limited circumstances by a June 21, 1995,
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Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-39).  Such conduct, however, raises prospects of other
nations using similar tactics against U.S. citizens.
Rewards for Information Program.  Money is a powerful motivator.  Rewards for
information have been instrumental in Italy in destroying the Red Brigades and in Colombia
in apprehending drug cartel leaders.  A State Department program is in place, supplemented
by the aviation industry, usually offering rewards of up to $5 million to anyone providing
information that would prevent or resolve an act of international terrorism against U.S.
citizens or U.S. property, or that leads to the arrest or conviction of terrorist criminals
involved in such acts.  This program contributed to the 1997 arrest of  Mir Amal Kansi who
shot CIA personnel in Virginia, and possibly to the arrest of Ramzi Yousef, architect of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, in 1995.  The bounty for the capture of Osama bin Laden
and his aide Ayman al Zawahiri has been raised to $25 million.
Extradition/Law Enforcement Cooperation.  International cooperation  in such
areas as law enforcement, customs control, and intelligence activities is an essential pillar
of the Bush Administration anti-terrorism policy.  For example, the stationing of FBI agents
overseas in close to 50 countries facilitates investigations of terrorist crimes and augments
the flow of intelligence about terrorist group structures and membership.  One law
enforcement tool in combating international terrorism is extradition of terrorists.
International extradition traditionally has been subject to several limitations, including the
refusal of some countries  to extradite for political or extraterritorial offenses or  to extradite
their nationals.  Also, the U.S. application of the death penalty for certain crimes can impede
extradition in terrorism related cases.  The United States has been negotiating and concluding
treaties with fewer limitations, in part as a means of facilitating the transfer of wanted
terrorists.  Because much terrorism involves politically motivated violence, the State
Department has sought to curtail the availability of the political offense exception, found in
many extradition treaties, to avoid extradition. 
Military Force.  Although not without difficulties, military force, particularly when
wielded by a superpower such as the United States, can carry substantial clout.  Proponents
of selective use of military force usually emphasize the military’s unique skills and
specialized equipment.  The April 1986 decision to bomb Libya for its alleged role in the
bombing of a German discotheque exemplifies use of military force.  Other examples are (1)
the 1993 bombing of Iraq’s military intelligence headquarters by U.S. forces in response to
Iraqi efforts to assassinate former President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait; (2) the
August 1998 missile attacks against bases in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical production
facility, al-Shifa, in Sudan; (3) the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001-
2002; (4) ongoing U.S. operations in Afghanistan, and arguably (5) the Iraq war launched on
March 19, 2003.  Moreover, U.S. military components are currently involved  in a variety
of anti-terrorism related missions, exercises, and deployments in areas such as Colombia, the
Horn of Africa, Djibouti, and Georgia.
Successful use of military force for preemptive or retaliatory strikes presupposes the
ability to identify a terrorist perpetrator or its state sponsor, as well as the precise location of
the group, information that is often unavailable from U.S. intelligence sources.  Generally,
terrorists possess modest physical facilities that present few high-value targets for military
strikes.  Some critics have observed that military action is a blunt instrument that can cause
foreign civilian casualties as well as collateral damage to economic installations in the target
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country. According to a July 21, 2002, New York Times report, a “pattern of mistakes” in the
U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan killed “as many as 400 civilians” in 11 different
locations. Others argue that such action inflates terrorists’ sense of importance and facilitates
their recruitment efforts.  A 1999 U.S. study of the sociology and psychology of terrorism
states that “counterterrorist military attacks against elusive terrorists may serve only to
radicalize large sectors of the Muslim population and damage the U.S. image worldwide,”
[http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf].  Other disadvantages or
risks associated with the use of military force include counter-retaliation and escalation by
terrorist groups or their state sponsors, failure to destroy the leaders of the organization, and
the perception that the United States ignores rules of international law. In addition, the costs
associated with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan have concerned some
observers, as have costs of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.   
International Conventions.  To date, the United States has joined with the world
community in developing all of the major anti-terrorism conventions.  These conventions
impose on their signatories an obligation either to prosecute offenders or extradite them to
permit prosecution for a host of terrorism-related crimes, including hijacking vessels and
aircraft, taking hostages, and harming diplomats.  An important convention is the Convention
for the Marking of Plastic Explosives. Implementing legislation is in P.L. 104-132.  On July
26, 2002, the U.N. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the U.N. Anti-
Terrorism Financing Convention both entered into force for the United States; see
[http://untreaty.un.org/English/terrorism.asp].
Potential Tools
An International Court for Terrorism.  Many experts have urged that an
international court be established, perhaps under the U.N., to sit in permanent session to
adjudicate cases against persons accused of international terrorist crimes. 
Media Self-Restraint.  For some, the term “media self-restraint” is an oxymoron;
the sensational scoop is the golden fleece, and dull copy is to be avoided.  In the past, the
media have been occasionally manipulated into the role of mediator and publicist of terrorist
goals. Increasingly, the media is sensitive to such charges.  On October 11, 2001, five major
U.S. news organizations agreed to abridge video statements by Osama bin Laden and this
policy continues to date.
Policy Reform and 9/11 Commission Recommendations
Well before the September 11, 2001 events, various legislative proposals and
congressionally mandated panels had called for reconfiguring the federal government’s
strategic planning and decision processes vis-à-vis the global terrorist threat.  On November
25, 2002, the President signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296),
consolidating at least 22 separate federal agencies, offices, and research centers comprising
more than 169,000 employees into a new cabinet level Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).  The creation of the new department, charged with coordinating defenses and
responses to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, constitutes the most substantial reorganization of
the Federal government agencies since the National Security Act of 1947 which placed the
different military departments under a Secretary of Defense and created the National Security
Council (NSC) and CIA.  P.L. 107-296 includes provisions for an information analysis
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element within DHS, many of the envisioned tasks of which appear assigned to the
Administration’s Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) which was activated May 1,
2003.
 In the 107th Congress, the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in October 2001 (P.L.107-56),
gave law enforcement increased authority to investigate suspected terrorists, including
enhanced surveillance procedures such as roving wiretaps; provided for strengthened controls
on international money laundering and financing of terrorism; improved measures for
strengthening of defenses along the U.S. northern border, and authorized disclosure of
foreign intelligence information obtained in criminal investigations to intelligence and
national security officials.
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(“9/11 Commission”) issued its final report [http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html].
Included are forty-one recommendations for changing the way the government is organized
to combat terrorism and how it and prioritizes its efforts. Many of these dovetail with
elements of the Administration’s February 14, 2003, National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html] such as
diplomacy and counter-proliferation efforts, preemption, intelligence and information fusion,
winning hearts and minds — including not only public diplomacy, but also policies that
encourage development and more open societies, law enforcement cooperation, and
defending the homeland.  See also [http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/
31-646035.html]. 
Recommendations generally fall into the categories of (1) preemption (attacking
terrorists and combating the growth of Islamic terrorism); (2) protecting against and
preparing for attacks; (3) coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and
sharing of information; (4) enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness
of intelligence and counterterrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations; (5)
centralizing congressional oversight and review of homeland security activities; and (6)
beefing up FBI, DoD, and DHS capacity to assess terrorist threats and their concomitant
response strategies and capabilities.  The report specifically recommends confronting openly
problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship (presumably issues such as terrorist financing to
include arguably the issue of ideological incitement).  The report also recommends sustaining
aid to Pakistan. On December 17, 2004,  President Bush signed  the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458) establishing the position of
National Intelligence Director and a National Counterterrorism Center. 
       Press reports dated May 30, 2005, indicate that the Bush Administration has launched
a high level internal review of its anti-terrorism strategy with an emphasis on developing a
strategy more focused on combating violent extremism. Under the revised strategy concept,
public diplomacy is expected to receive a major boost in emphasis leading some to question




U.S. Interagency Coordination Framework 
and Program Response 
The interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas is a complex web of
relationships among federal organizations and agencies. Some agencies play lead roles in
specific areas; others play coordination roles; yet others serve in support roles.  In short, the
National Security Council (NSC) advises the President on national security and foreign
policy; serves as a forum for discussion among the President, presidential advisers, and
cabinet officials; and is the President’s mechanism for coordinating policy among
government agencies on interdisciplinary issues such as terrorism. Under the NSC structure
are a series of committees and working groups which address terrorism issues.  Key is the
Counterterrorism Security Group composed of high-level representatives from the
Departments of State, Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security, and the FBI and CIA, as
well as representatives of other departments or agencies as needed.  A series of interagency
working groups under the Counterterrorism Security Group coordinate specific efforts as
needed.
The Office of Homeland Security is a homeland security council analogous to the
National Security Council [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/index.jsp].  Located within the
Executive Office of the President, it has a number of working groups called policy
coordinating committees which coordinate policy and operations across the executive
departments to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United
States.  The Department of State, [http://www.state.gov/], is the lead agency for U.S.
government efforts to combat terrorism overseas; whereas the Department of Justice,
[http://www.usdoj.gov/], is the lead agency for  law enforcement and criminal matters related
to terrorism overseas and domestically.
On December 17, 2004,  President Bush signed  the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458) establishing the position of National
Intelligence Director (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the
President’s principal intelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and
domestic activities of the intelligence community. Established as well is a National Counter-
terrorism Center designed  to serve as a central knowledge bank for information about known
and suspected terrorists and to coordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities
of all government agencies. The Center also prepares the daily terrorism threat report for the
President. 
Antiterrorism Assistance and Terrorism and Crime Programs
The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program is a central part of
the effort to help nations develop the capacity to effectively combat terrorism. The ATA
Program provides training and equipment to foreign countries to help them improve their
antiterrorism capabilities.  More than 35,000 individuals from 152 countries have received
training since the program’s inception in 1983 in such skills as crisis management, VIP
protection, airport security management, and bomb detection and deactivation.  The TIPOFF
terrorism and crime database, maintained by the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, enables the use of sensitive intelligence to detect “known persons of concern” as
they apply for U.S. visas overseas, and as of mid-November 2003 had provided the names
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of 96, 190 possible terrorists to State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). The
Department of State’s Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), initiated in FY2002, helps
foreign governments improve their border control capability through software for creating
an automated database watchlist for fusion of names and relevant data.  A benefit of TIP is
that it  provides immigration officials in selected countries with a computer-based, real-time
system to verify the identities of travelers presenting themselves at border crossings. 
Assistance to Victims Programs
Facilitating payment of compensation to victims of terrorism by state sponsors or their
agents is an ongoing area of congressional interest.  P.L. 106-386, among other things,
allowed victims of terrorist acts committed by Cuba and Iran to collect payment of judgments
rendered from funds held by the U.S. government and clarified circumstances under which
immunity from jurisdiction or attachment may not apply when victims of state-sponsored
terrorism seek compensation.
Counterterrorism Research and Development Program
The State Department’s Counterterrorism Research and Development Program is
overseen by State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism and is managed by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The program
focuses on the inter-agency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which constitutes
an R&D response to the threat posed by increasingly sophisticated equipment, explosives,
and technology available to terrorist groups.  Major project areas include chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; explosives detection and improvised
device defeat; infrastructure protection; investigative support and forensics; personnel
protection; physical security; surveillance collection and operations support; and tactical
operations support.  State and DOD provide core funding for TSWG activities.
Diplomatic Security Program
The Diplomatic Security Program of the State Department is designed to protect U.S.
personnel, information, and facilities domestically and abroad.  Constructing secure facilities
abroad, providing security guards, and supporting counterintelligence are some important
elements of the program as is detection and investigation of passport and visa fraud. 
Options for Program Enhancement
Potential areas for improvement of programs to combat terrorism include enhancing
information and network security; nuclear materials safeguards; detection of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and conventional explosives; and critical infrastructure
protection and disaster/crisis consequence management, including training of first
responders.  One option might include an enhanced role for the National Academies and the
National Laboratories in facilitating more concerted and better coordinated involvement of
the U.S. scientific community in assessing threats, developing countermeasures, and
designing responses to terrorism.  See [http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10415.html].
